Abstract. In this paper we study a continuous time, optimal stochastic investment problem under limited resources in a market with N firms. The investment processes are subject to a time-dependent stochastic constraint. Rather than using a dynamic programming approach, we exploit the concavity of the profit functional to derive some necessary and sufficient first order conditions for the corresponding Social Planner optimal policy. Our conditions are a stochastic infinite-dimensional generalization of the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem. The Lagrange multiplier takes the form of a nonnegative optional random measure on [0, T ] which is flat off the set of times for which the constraint is binding, i.e. when all the fuel is spent. As a subproduct we obtain an enlightening interpretation of the first order conditions for a single firm in Bank [4] . In the infinite-horizon case, with operating profit functions of Cobb-Douglas type, our method allows the explicit calculation of the optimal policy in terms of the 'base capacity' process, i.e. the unique solution of the Bank and El Karoui representation problem [3] .
Introduction
In the latest years the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty has received much attention in Economics as well as in Mathematics (see, for example, the extensive review in Dixit and Pindyck [10] ). From the mathematical point of view, optimal irreversible investment problems under uncertainty are singular stochastic control problems. In fact, the economic constraint that does not allow disinvestment may be modeled as a 'monotone follower' problem; that is, a problem in which investment strategies are given by nondecreasing stochastic processes, not necessarily absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure as functions of time. The application of 'monotone follower' problems to Economics started with the pioneering papers by Karatzas [15] , Karatzas and Shreve [16] , El Karoui and Karatzas [11] (among others). These Authors studied, by probabilistic arguments, the problem of optimally minimizing a convex cost (or optimally maximizing a concave profit) functional when the controlled diffusion is a Brownian motion tracked by a nondecreasing process, i.e. the monotone follower. They showed that any such control problem is closely linked to a suitable optimal stopping problem whose value function v is the derivative of the value function V of the original control problem.
In the last decade several papers handled singular stochastic control problems of the monotone follower type by deriving first order conditions for optimality and without relying on any Markovian or diffusive setting. That is the case, for instance, of Bank and Riedel [1] in which the Authors studied an intertemporal utility maximization problem with Hindy, Huang and Kreps preferences, of Bank and Riedel [2] in which the optimal dynamic choice of durable and perishable goods is analyzed, or of Riedel and Su [20] in which a very general irreversible investment problem with unlimited resources is treated. In these papers the optimal consumption, or investment policy, is constructed as the running supremum of a desirable value. Such level of satisfaction is the optional solution of a stochastic backward equation in the spirit of Bank-El Karoui (cf. [3] , Theorem 3) and may be represented in terms of the value functions of a family of standard optimal stopping problems.
The investment problem becomes even harder if one takes into account the fact that the available resources may be limited. The problem turns into a 'finite-fuel' singular stochastic control problem since the total amount of effort (fuel) available to the controller (for example, the firm's manager) is limited. The mathematical literature on this field started in 1967 with Bather and Chernoff [6] in the context of controlling the motion of a spaceship. Finite fuel monotone follower problems were then studied by Beneš, Shepp and Witsenhausen in 1980 [7] . In 1985 Chow, Menaldi and Robin [9] and Karatzas [17] used a PDE approach and purely probabilistic arguments, respectively, to show that the optimal policy of a 'monotone follower' problem with constant finite fuel is 'follow the unconstrained optimal policy until there is some fuel to spend'. Much more difficult is the case of finite fuel given by a time-dependent process, either deterministic or stochastic.
In 2005 Bank [4] , without relying on any Markovian assumption, generalized the optimal policy proposed by Karatzas [17] to the case of a stochastic, increasing, adapted finite fuel process θ. The Author characterized the optimal policy of a cost minimization problem as the unique process satisfying some first order conditions for optimality (cf. [4] , Theorem 2.2), 'the optimal control should be exercised only when its impact on future costs is maximal; on the other hand, when the cost functional's subgradient tends to decrease, then all the available fuel must be used'. More in detail, if S(ν) is the Snell envelope of the total cost functional's subgradient ∇C(ν) (i.e., S(ν)(t) := ess inf t≤τ ≤T E{∇C(τ )|F t }), and M(ν) + A(ν) is its Doob-Meyer decomposition into a uniformly integrable martingale M(ν) and a predictable, nondecreasing process A(ν), then Bank [4] , Theorem 2.2, proved that ν * is optimal if and only if (i) ν * is flat off {∇C(ν * ) = S(ν * )},
(ii) A(ν * ) is flat off {ν * = θ}.
(1.1)
Moreover, the Author constructed the optimal control ν * in terms of the 'base capacity' process, i.e. a desirable value of capacity. Mathematically such process is the optional solution of a suitable Bank-El Karoui representation problem [3] . In this paper we generalize Bank's single firm problem to the case of a Social Planner in a market with N firms in which the total investment is bounded by a stochastic, time-dependent, increasing, adapted finite fuel θ(t); that is, the case
The Social Planner's objective is to pursue a vector ν * ∈ R N + of efficient irreversible investment processes that maximize the aggregate expected profit, net of investment costs, i.e.
Here the operating profit function R (i) of firm i, i = 1, 2, ..., N , depends directly on the cumulative control exercised since we do not allow for dynamics of the productive capacity. As in Kobila [18] , and Riedel and Su [20] (among others), the uncertain status of the economy is modeled by an exogeneous economic shock {X(t), t ∈ [0, T ]}. Although our finite fuel θ is increasing as in Bank [4] , his results cannot be directly applied to each firm since for each i the investment bound θ − j =i ν (j) is not an increasing process. To overcome this difficulty we develop a new approach based on a stochastic generalization of the classical Kuhn-Tucker method. That is accomplished as follows. By applying a version of Komlòs' theorem for optional random measures (cf. Kabanov [14] , Lemma 3.5) we prove existence and uniqueness of optimal irreversible investment policies. Then we use the concavity of the profit functional to characterize the optimal Social Planner policy as the unique solution of some stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The Lagrange multiplier takes the form of a nonnegative optional random measure on [0, T ] which is flat off the set of times for which the constraint is binding, i.e. when all the fuel is spent. Hence, as a subproduct we obtain an enlightening interpretation of the first order conditions that Bank [4] proved for a single firm optimal investment problem. In fact, we show that measure the dA(ν * ) in (1.1) is equal to the Lagrange multiplier of our control problem
A ⊆ {t ≥ 0 : ν * (ω, t) = θ(ω, t)}, and so it inherits all the regularity properties of dλ. As expected in optimization under inequality constraints, our Lagrange multiplier λ can grow only when the resource constraint is binding. Moreover, as a new result, it is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. In the case of constant finite fuel, we consider two classical monotone follower problems for which the optimal policy is known. By Ito's Lemma, we are able to explicitly find the compensator part in the Doob-Meyer decomposition of the profit (cost) functional's supergradient (subgradient) and to identify it with the Lagrange multiplier of the optimal investment problem. We show that dλ has the usual interpretation of shadow price and, again, it has a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Finally, when the N firms have operating profit functions of Cobb-Douglas type, with a different parameter for each of them, our generalized stochastic Kuhn-Tucker approach allows for the explicit calculation of the Social Planner optimal investment strategy. Such optimal policy is given in terms of the 'base capacity' processes l (i) , i.e. the unique solutions of suitable Bank-El Karoui representation problems [3] . Indeed, we show that the optimal Social Planner investment policy for firm i, i = 1, 2, ..., N , behaves like that of a monopolistic firm which has at disposal a fraction β i of the available resources θ; that is,
with y (i) initial capacity value for firm i. In particular, that fraction is given by
, and therefore β i (t)θ(t) represents a 'fair amount' of resources that has to be assigned to firm i according to its desirable value of capacity at time t, i.e. l (i) (t). Even in this more complicated multivariate case, we derive the explicit form of the absolutely continuous Lagrange multiplier optional measure. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set the model. In Section 3 we introduce the generalized stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the Social Planner problem. In Section 4 we find the Lagrange multiplier optional measure for some 'finite-fuel' problems from the literature (cf. Bank [4] and Karatzas [17] , among others). Finally, in Section 5 we explicitly solve an N -firm Social Planner optimization problem with Cobb-Douglas operating profits and stochastic, time-dependent 'finite-fuel'.
The Model
We consider a market with N firms on a time horizon T ≤ +∞. Let (Ω, F, {F t } t∈[0,T ] , P) be a complete filtered probability space with the filtration {F t , t ∈ [0, T ]} satisfying the usual conditions. The cumulative irreversible investment of firm i up to time t, i = 1, 2, ..., N , denoted by ν (i) (t), is an adapted process, nondecreasing, left-continuous, finite a.s. s.t.
The firms are financed entirely by equities but we focus primarily on the irreversibility of investments and do not model precisely the rest of the economy. It is reasonable to assume that the firms cannot invest in natural resources as much as they like. In fact, we assume that the total amount of natural resources available at time t is a finite quantity θ(t); that is,
The stochastic time-dependent constraint {θ(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} is the cumulative amount of resources extracted up to time t. It is a nonnegative and nondecreasing adapted process with left-continuous paths, which starts at time zero from θ(0) = θ o > 0. We assume
We denote by S θ the nonempty set of admissible investment plans, i.e.
, P-a.s., i = 1, 2, ..., N, and
Let {X(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} be some exogenous real-valued state variable progressively measurable with respect to F t . It may be regarded as an economic shock, reflecting the changes in technological ouput, demand and macroeconomic conditions which have direct or indirect effect on the firm's profit. At the moment we do not make any Markovian assumption.
We take the capital good as numeraire, hence we express profits, costs etc. in real terms, not nominal ones. Hence the price of a unitary investment is equal to one. We take the point of view of a fictitious Social Planner aiming to maximize the aggregate expected profit, net of investment costs, J SP (ν) (see equation (2.5) below), by allocating efficiently the available resources. We denote by δ(t) the Social Planner discount factor. δ(t) is a nonnegative, optional process, bounded uniformly in (ω,
i.e. the investment plan's expected net present value of firm i is finite. The operating profit function of firm i is
.., N . At time t, when the investment of firm i is ν (i) (t), R (i) X(t), ν (i) (t) represents the revenue of firm i under the shock process X(t). The Social Planner problem is
where
and, for i = 1, 2, ..., N ,
Notice that J i (ν (i) ) is the expected total profit, net of investment costs, of firm i when the Social Planner picks ν ∈ S θ . The operating profit functions satisfy the following concavity and regularity assumptions.
Assumption 2.1.
1.
For every x ∈ R and i = 1, 2, ..., N , the mapping y → R (i) (x, y) is increasing, strictly concave and with R (i) (x, 0) = 0. Moreover, it has continuous partial derivative R y (x, y) satisfying the Inada conditions
y (x, y) = 0.
The process
Under (2.2) and Assumption 2.1 the net profit J i (ν (i) ) is well defined and finite for all admissible plans.
A Stochastic Kuhn-Tucker Approach
In this Section we aim to characterize the optimal investment plan by means of a gradient approach. As in Riedel and Su [20] , proof of Theorem 2.6, by applying a suitable version of Komlòs' Theorem for optional random measures (cf. Kabanov [14] , Lemma 3.5) we obtain existence and uniqueness of a solution to problem (2.4). In fact, Komlòs' Theorem states that if a sequence of random variables (Z n ) n∈N is bounded from above in expectation, then there exists a subsequence (Z n k ) k∈N which converges in the Cesàro sense to some random variable Z. In our case the limit provided by Komlòs' Theorem turns out to be the optimal investment strategy.
Theorem 3.1. Under (2.2) and Assumption 2.1, there exists a unique optimal vector of irreversible investment plans ν * ∈ S θ for problem (2.4).
Proof. Let ν ∈ S θ and denote by H the space of optional measures on [0, T ]. Then, the investment strategies ν (i) may be regarded as elements of H, hence S θ ⊂ H N . Let (ν n ) n∈N be a maximizing sequence of investment plans in S θ , i.e. a sequence such that lim
By a version of Komlòs' Theorem for optional measures (cf. Kabanov [14] , Lemma 3.5), there exists a subsequence (ν n ) n∈N that converges weakly a.s. in the Cesàro sense to some random vector ν * ∈ H N . That is, for i = 1, 2, ..., N , we have, almost surely,Î
for every point of continuity of ν (i) * , i = 1, 2, ..., N . Notice thatν n ∈ S θ for all n implies that also the Cesàro sequenceÎ n belongs to S θ due to the convexity of S θ , hence
which means ν * ∈ S θ . Since (ν
n ) n∈N by concavity of the profit functional. Then, applying Jensen inequality and using Assumption 2.1, we have
by dominated convergence theorem. Finally, uniqueness follows from the strict concavity of the Social Planner profit functional.
We now aim to characterize the Social Planner optimal policy as the unique solution of a set of first order generalized stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Notice that the strictly concave functionals J i , i = 1, 2, ..., N , admit the supergradient
for t ∈ [0, T ], in the sense that we have
for all admissible investment plans
.., N , may be interpreted as the marginal expected profit resulting from an additional infinitesimal investment at time t when the investment plan is
is the Riesz representation of the profit gradient at ν (i) . More precisely, define ∇ y J i (ν (i) ) as the optional projection of the product-measurable process
) is uniquely determined up to P-indistinguishability and it holds
for all admissible ν (i) (cf. Jacod [13] , Theorem 1.33).
Generalized Stochastic Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
Recall that if β is a right-continuous, adapted and nondecreasing process, then the bracket operator
is well defined (possibly infinite) for all processes α which are nonnegative and
Notice that the bracket is preserved when we pass from α to its optional projection α (o) (cf. Jacod [13] , Theorem 1.33); that is
Since the constraint is
where dλ(ω, t) is a nonnegative optional measure, which may be interpreted as the Lagrange multiplier of Social Planner problem (2.4). By using Fubini's Theorem we write the bracket
We now obtain stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality with a stochastic Lagrange multiplier process that takes care of our dynamic resource constraint. A similar approach may be found in Bank and Riedel [1] for an intertemporal utility maximization problem under a static budget constraint, with Hindy, Huang and Kreps preferences. From now on, T denotes the set of all stopping times τ with values in [0, T ], P-a.s. 
then ν * is the unique solution of the Social Planner problem (2.4).
Proof. Let ν * satisfy the first order Kuhn-Tucker conditions (3.9) and let ν be an arbitrary admissible plan. By concavity of R (i) (x, ·), i = 1, 2, ..., N , and Fubini's Theorem we have
where we have used Remark 3.2 for the last equality. Now (3.9) implies
and the nonnegativity of dλ(t), the admissibility of ν, and another application of Fubini's Theorem give
where the last line follows from (3.9), third condition.
Conditions (3.9) are also necessary for optimality under the assumption that
Theorem 3.4. Assume (3.12). If ν * is optimal for the Social Planner problem (2.4), then it satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (3.9) for some nonnegative Lagrange multiplier dλ(ω, t) such that E{ [0,T ) dλ(t)} < ∞.
Proof. The proof splits into two steps. The arguments resemble those of the finite-dimensional Kuhn-Tucker Theorem. Let ν * be optimal for problem (2.4).
Step 1. We show that under (3.12) the optimal policy ν * solves the linearized problem with finite value
by Remark 3.2 being Φ * i , as defined in (3.5), the product-measurable process associated to
.., N . In fact, let ν be an admissible plan and fix ǫ ∈ (0, 1).
y . Optimality of ν * , concavity of y → R (i) (X(t), y) and Fubini's Theorem imply
it suffices to apply Fatou's Lemma since
For that, however, we must find P-integrable random variables, G i (ω), i = 1, 2, ..., N , such that
We write I ǫ i as
by Fubini's Theorem. Then, from concavity of y → R (i) (x, y) and
(3.17)
we obtain
). Hence we define
Now (2.2), Assumption 2.1 and condition (3.12), imply the integrability of
Step 2.
We now characterize solutions of the linearized problem (3.13) by some flat-off conditions, like the second and the third ones of (3.9). Define Ψ(t) := ess sup
Thanks to Assumption 2.1, Ψ is a supermartingale of class (D) with unique Dobb-Meyer decomposition into a uniformly integrable martingale M and an increasing, predictable process λ with integrable terminal value λ(T ); that is, Ψ(t) = M (t) − λ(t). Now, by arguments similar to those in the proof of Bank [4] , Lemma 2.5, we show that every solutionν = (ν (1) , ...,ν (N ) ) of (3.13) must necessarily satisfy the following conditions
Then (3.20) will also hold for ν * by Step 1. We start by noticing that for any ν ∈ S θ we have
by definition (3.19). The first equality follows from Ψ(t) = E{ T t dλ(s)|F t } since Ψ(T ) = 0, whereas Fubini's Theorem yields the second one. Obviously, if ν satisfies (3.20), we have equalities in (3.21). On the other hand, if
then equalities hold through (3.21) and we obtain (3.20) . It remains to show (3.22) . For every i = 1, 2, ..., N and k ∈ N define the sequence of stopping times
23) and then set
(t), i = 1, 2, ..., N.
As in [4] , proof of Lemma 2.5, we have
and by letting k ↑ ∞ we obtain (3.22).
In conclusion, we have shown that, under (3.12), the solution of problem (2.4) solves (3.13) as well. On the other hand, any solution to (3.13) is characterized by the 'flat-off conditions' (3.20) and this concludes the proof.
Remark 3.5. We point out that our stochastic Kuhn-Tucker approach may be generalized to the case of investment processes also bounded from below by a stochastic process. In that case the Lagrangian functional is defined in terms of two Lagrange multipliers, dλ 1 (ω, t) and dλ 2 (ω, t).
Finding the Lagrange Multiplier for Some Known Models
In this Section, we consider some 'finite-fuel' problems from the literature (cf. Bank [4] and Karatzas [17] , among others) for which the form of the optimal investment is known (see (4.1), (4.21) and (4.32) below). We shall provide the explicit form of the corresponding Lagrange multiplier optional measure dλ (see (4.17), (4.29) and (4.40) below). It turns out that dλ differs from dA at most for its sign, where A is the compensator in the Doob-Meyer decomposition of the profit (cost) functional supergradient's (subgradient's) Snell envelope. In particular, we shall prove that dλ (and dA) is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. In the following examples we assume δ(t) = δt, with δ > 0, and T = +∞.
The Finite Fuel Monotone Follower of Bank [4]
In the setting of Section 2, under (2.2) and Assumption 2.1, we take N = 1 and T = +∞. We set ν := ν (1) , y := y (1) , R := R (1) and J := J 1 . Notice that with c(ω, t, ν(ω, t)) := −e −δt R(X(ω, t), ν(ω, t)), and instantaneous cost of investment
we recover Bank's model [4] . Recall that Bank's optimal investment (cf. Bank [4] , Theorem 3.1) was given by ν * (t) := sup
in terms of the 'base capacity' process l(t) (cf. Riedel and Su [20] , Definition 3.1) which uniquely solves the stochastic backward equation (cf. Bank and El Karoui [3] , Theorem 1 and Theorem 3)
Easily adapting to our setting arguments as in Bank and Küchler [5] , proof of Theorem 1, one can show that l has upper right-continuous sample paths; that is, l(t) = lim sup s↓t l(s).
We show the optimality of ν * (t) by means of our generalized Kuhn-Tucker conditions; as a subproduct we obtain an enlightening interpretation of the first order conditions stated in Bank [4] , Theorem 2.2, for a single firm optimal investment problem.
Recall that the supergradient of the net profit functional is the unique optional process given by
By Theorem 3.3 an investment plan ν * (t) is optimal if
for some nonnegative optional random measure dλ(ω, t) such that E{ ∞ 0 dλ(s)} < +∞. One may easily see from (4.7) that dλ is flat off {ν * = θ}. Lemma 4.1. For almost every ω ∈ Ω one has [R y (X(ω, t), θ(ω, t)) − δ] 1 {l(ω,·)>θ(ω,·)} (t) ≥ 0.
Proof. Take t ≥ 0 arbitrary but fixed. Then, for any stopping time τ 1 ≥ t a.s., equation (4.2) and the decreasing property of R y in its second argument imply that
In particular, for ǫ > 0, define τ 1 (ǫ) := inf{s ≥ t : R y (X(s), l(t)) > R y (X(t), l(t)) + ǫ} (with the usual convention inf{∅} = +∞) to obtain that a.s.
Now (4.9) and (4.8) with τ 1 ≡ τ 1 (ǫ) imply R y (X(t), l(t)) + ǫ ≥ δ a.s. for all ǫ > 0. It follows R y (X(t), l(t)) ≥ δ a.s., and hence [R y (X(t), θ(t)) − δ] 1 {l(·)≥θ(·)} (t) ≥ 0 a.s. for all t ≥ 0, by concavity of y → R(x, y).
In the next Theorem we prove optimality of ν * as in (4.1) and, as a new result, we explicitly evaluate the form of the associated Lagrange multiplier measure dλ. Optimality of ν * can be shown adapting arguments of Bank [4] , proof of Theorem 3.1. However, we provide here the details for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 4.2. The process ν * (t) defined in (4.1) is optimal and the Lagrange multiplier dλ(t) is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Proof. It suffices to check the generalized Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.4)-(4.7) for ν * (t). Obviously ν * is admissible and satisfies (4.6). Recall that the available resources process θ(t) is nondecreasing and left-continuous. To show (4.4), (4.5) and (4.7), first of all fix an arbitrary τ ∈ T , define 10) and notice that ρ θ (τ ) is a point of increase for sup τ ≤u<s l(u), s > ρ θ (τ ). Following the arguments of Bank [4] , proof of Theorem 3.1, we can now evaluate the Snell envelope of ∇ y J (ν * ). From (4.1) we have
, by definition of ρ θ (τ ) and upper right-continuity of l. Also, sup τ ≤u<s l(u) = sup ρ θ (τ )≤u<s l(u), for s > ρ θ (τ ), and (4.2) imply
with equality in (4.11) and (4.12) if and only if τ is a point of increase for ν * (that is, dν * (τ ) > 0). Notice that the last term in the right-hand side of (4.12) does coincide with the Snell envelope, S(ν * ), of ∇ y J (ν * ) (cf. Bank [4] , proof of Theorem 3.1); that is,
Thanks to Assumption 2.1, S(ν * ) is a process of class (D). Indeed, for any stopping time τ ∈ T and for some positive constant C (depending on y), one has
where for the second inequality we have used that R(x, ·) is strictly concave, increasing and such that R(x, 0) = 0, x ∈ R. Also, the process {E{ ∞ 0 e −δs R(X(s), θ(s)) ds|F t }} t≥0 is a uniformly integrable martingale by the second part of Assumption 2.1 (see, e.g., Revuz and Yor [19] , Chapter II, Theorem 3.1) and hence the family of random variables {E{ ∞ 0 e −δs R(X(s), θ(s)) ds|F τ }, τ ∈ T } is uniformly integrable by Revuz and Yor [19] , Chapter II, Theorem 3.2. It follows that S(ν * ) is of class (D).
If A(ν * ) denotes the unique predictable (hence optional) increasing process in the DoobMeyer decomposition of the supermartingale S(ν * ), then S(ν * )(t) = E {A(∞) − A(t) |F t }, since ∇ y J (ν * )(∞) = 0. Therefore ν * (as defined in (4.1)) fulfills (4.4), (4.5) and (4.7) if we identify dλ with the optional nonnegative random measure dA(ν * ); i.e., if we set dλ ≡ dA(ν * ).
We now aim to find the form of the Lagrange multiplier, that is the compensator part dA(ν * ) of the Doob-Meyer decomposition of S(ν * ), and to show that dλ is flat off {ν * = θ}. Recalling (4.10) it is not hard to see that {S(ν * )(u ∧ ρ θ (t))} u≥t is an F u -martingale, for any t ≥ 0 arbitrary but fixed; thus, S(ν * ) is a martingale until the base capacity l is below the finite fuel θ. In fact, by iterated conditioning and the fact that ρ θ (u 1 ∧ ρ θ (t)) = ρ θ (u 2 ∧ ρ θ (t)) for all u 1 , u 2 ∈ [t, ∞), it follows that {S(ν * )(u ∧ ρ θ (t))} u≥t is an F u∧ρ θ (t) -martingale. Then {S(ν * )(u ∧ ρ θ (t))} u≥t is an F u -martingale by Revuz and Yor [19] , Corollary 3.6.
Next, we define σ θ (t) := inf{s > t : l(s) ≤ θ(s+)} and we show that {S(ν * )(u ∧ σ θ (t))} u≥t is an F u -submartingale. In fact, from ρ θ (u ∧ σ θ (t)) = u ∧ σ θ (t) for all u ≥ t, it follows that the process
is an F u∧σ θ (t) -martingale, and therefore an F u -martingale. Moreover, since θ(s) ≥ sup 0≤u<s (l(u)∧ θ(u)) ≥ sup t≤u<s (l(u) ∧ θ(u)) = θ(s), for any s ∈ (t, σ θ (t)), the integrand in (4.15) is equal to e −δs [R y (X(s), θ(s)) − δ] and it is nonnegative by Lemma 4.1. Therefore, by uniqueness of the Doob-Meyer decomposition, we may conclude that
It follows that A(ν * ) increases only on the set {s ≥ 0 : l(ω, s) > θ(ω, s+)} (a subset of {s ≥ 0 : ν * (ω, s) = θ(ω, s)}), i.e. at those times s such that s = ρ θ (s) a.s., and hence we may write the Lagrange multiplier dλ = dA(ν * ) as
In conclusion, given ν * as in (4.1), we have shown E{ ∞ τ e −δs R y (X(s), ν * (s)) ds |F τ } ≤ e −δτ +E{ ∞ τ dλ(s)|F τ }, with dλ = dA(ν * ), and with equality if and only if τ is a time of increase for ν * (·). It follows that (4.4)-(4.7) hold and hence the process (4.1) is optimal by Theorem 3.3. Moreover, we have proved that the paths of A(ν * )(t) (and hence of dλ) are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and have Radon-Nykodym derivative e −δt [R y (X(t), θ(t))− δ]1 {l(·)>θ(· +)} (t).
The argument of the proof of Theorem 4.2 allows an enlightening interpretation of the first order conditions in Bank [4] . Recall that S(ν) is the Snell envelope of the supergradient ∇ y J (ν), i.e. S(ν)(t) = ess sup
Then Bank [4] , Theorem 2.2, shows that the optimal investment plan ν * is characterized by the following conditions ν * is flat off 19) where A(ν * ) is the predictable increasing process in the Doob-Meyer decomposition of the supermartingale S(ν * ). Here we have shown that dλ ≡ dA(ν * ) and therefore that the second first order condition of (4.19) coincides with the Kuhn-Tucker condition (4.7); that is, the Lagrange multiplier can grow only when the constraint is binding. That generalizes in our stochastic, infinite dimensional setting the usual rule one has in optimization under inequality constraint.
Remark 4.3. The usual interpretation of the Lagrange multiplier as the shadow price of the value function may be heuristically shown as follows. After an integration by parts on the cost term, we may write the value function as
Now, if ν * (t) = y∨sup 0≤s<t (l(s)∧θ(s)), then the derivative (in some sense) of ν * with respect to θ does vanish off {ν * = θ}. We thus expect that the 'derivative' of V with respect to the constraint θ is e −δt [R y (X(t), θ(t))−δ] once the constraint is binding, which has exactly the form of the density of our Lagrange multiplier (4.17) . From an economic point of view, e −δt [R y (X(t), θ(t)) − δ] is the marginal profit, net of the user cost of capital, one has at time t if the productive capacity is θ(t). Therefore, it is exactly the willingness to pay at time t for relaxing the resources constraint.
Constant Finite Fuel and Quadratic Cost
Here we consider a monotone follower problem with constant finite fuel similar to those studied by Karatzas ([15] , [17] ), and Karatzas and Shreve [16] (among others). In particular, we discuss the example (cf. Bank [4] , Section 4.1) of optimal cost minimization for a firm that does not incur into investment's costs and has a running cost flow given by the convex function c(x, y) = 1 2 (x − y) 2 of the economic shock x and the investment y. That is, we study the constrained convex minimization problem
where W (t) is a standard Brownian motion and θ o is the positive constant finite fuel such that ν(t) ≤ θ o , P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0. From Bank [4] we know that the optimal investment policy is
which is the well known strategy of reflecting the Brownian motion at some threshold c until all the fuel is spent (cf. Karatzas [17] ). To identify c notice that
and that the backward equation
is uniquely solved by the base capacity
where c is the positive constant c := E{ ∞ 0 δe −δs sup 0≤u<s W (u) ds}, by independence and time-homogeneity of Brownian increments.
For this problem we expect to find a nonpositive Lagrange multiplier. We write the subgradient (4.22) at ν * as
and we use (4.23) with l given by (4.24) to have
This trivial trick puts us in the same setting as Bank [4] , proof of Theorem 3.1 (see also the first part of the proof of our Theorem 4.2 above). Hence we have that the Snell envelope of the subgradient evaluated at the optimum ν * (cf. (4.21)) is
by means of (4.21). Notice that ρ θo (t) is a time of increase for sup t≤u<s (W (u) − c), s > ρ θo (t).
Hence we have sup
Now we identify the Lagrange multiplier of problem (4.20) , that is the compensator part dA of the Doob-Meyer decomposition of S(ν * ). Given an arbirary t ≥ 0, we start by showing that S(ν * ) is a martingale until W − c is below the finite fuel θ o ; that is, {S(ν * )(u ∧ τ θ 0 (t))} u≥t is an F u -martingale. In fact, by Revuz and Yor [19] , Corollary 3.6, it suffices to prove that {S(ν * )(u ∧ τ θ 0 (t))} u≥t is an F u∧ρ θo (t) -martingale, and that follows by iterated conditioning and the fact that ρ θo (u 1 ∧ ρ θo (t)) = ρ θo (u 2 ∧ ρ θo (t)) for all u 1 , u 2 ∈ [t, ∞). Next, we define
and we show that S(ν * ) is a submartingale when the base capacity l is above the finite fuel θ o (this is a subset of {ν * = θ o }); that is {S(ν * )(u∧σ θo (t))} u≥t is an F u -submartingale. Again, as above, it suffices to prove that it is an an F u∧σ θo (t) -submartingale. In fact, from ρ θo (u∧σ θo (t)) = u∧σ θo (t) for all u ≥ t, the martingale property of W and δe −δs W (s)ds = −d(e −δs W (s)) + e −δs dW (s), follows that the process S(ν * )(u∧σ θo (t))+ u∧σ θo (t) t δe −δs (θ o −W (s))ds is an F u∧σ θo (t) -martingale, hence an F u -martingale. Therefore S(ν * )(u ∧ σ θo (t)) is an F u -submartingale with absolutely continuous compensator A(ν * ) given by
Finally, as the Lagrange multiplier must be flat off {s ≥ 0 : ν * (ω, s) = θ o } (cf. (4.7) and (4.17)), we conclude that the Lagrange multiplier of problem (4.20) is
which is, as expected, coincides with the opposite of the optional measure dA(ν * )(t) (cf. (4.28) ).
Constant Finite Fuel and Operating Profit of Cobb-Douglas Type
We consider the finite fuel version of the profit maximization problem, net of investment costs, of Riedel and Su [20] and we take the economic shock process X(t) to be a Geometric Brownian motion
That is, we study
where the controls satisfy 0 ≤ ν(t) ≤ θ o P-a.s., for all t ≥ 0, with θ o positive constant. The firm's operating profit function is of the Cobb-Douglas type and depends on the economic shock x and the investment policy y; i.e., R (x, y) = 1 1−α x α y 1−α with 0 < α < 1. As pointed out in [20] this construction is consistent with a competitive firm which produces at decreasing returns to scale or with a monopolist firm facing a constant elasticity demand function and constant returns to scale production. Notice that optimization problem (4.31) in the case of infinite fuel has also been studied in a diffusive setting in [18] by a dynamic programming approach.
It is known (cf. Bank [4] and Riedel and Su [20] ) that the unique optimal solution for problem (4.31) is given by ν * (t) = sup
where the optional process l(t) uniquely solves the stochastic backward equation (cf. Bank and El Karoui [3] )
As shown in Riedel and Su [20] , Proposition 7.1, when the shock process is of exponential Levy type, i.e. X(t) = x 0 e Y (t) , with Y (t) a Levy process such that Y (0) = 0, then the solution of (4.33) is given by the base capacity l(t) = kX(t), (4.34)
is an independent exponentially distributed time with parameter δ.
From (4.31) we have 
and where we have used (4.33) to obtain the second equality.
Lemma 4.4. Assume δ > µ + σ 2 . Then for every t ≥ 0, one has
Proof. The proof follows from the Markov property and the Laplace transform of a Gaussian process. Independence of Brownian increments, together with W (u+ρ θo (t))−W (ρ θo (t)) ∼ W (u), allow us to write
Notice that (δ − µα) + 1 2 σ 2 α(1 − α) > 0 by the assumption, hence (4.37) follows.
by Lemma 4.4 and (4.36). Arguments similar to those used in Subsection 4.2 allow us to identify the compensator part of its Doob-Meyer decomposition of S(ν * )(t) as the Lagrange multiplier of problem (4.31). In fact, we have that S(ν * ) is an F u -martingale until l is below the finite fuel
we show that S(ν * ) is an F u -supermartingale when the base capacity l is above the finite fuel θ o ; that is, {S(ν * )(u ∧ σ θo (t)} u≥t is an F u -supermartingale, for any arbitrary but fixed t ≥ 0. It suffices to prove that it is an F u∧σ θo (t) -supermartingale (cf. Revuz and Yor [19] , Corollary 3.6). In fact, from ρ θo (u ∧ σ θ 0 (t)) = u ∧ σ θo (t) for all u ≥ t and d(e −δs X α (s)) = −δe −δs X α (s)ds + e −δs dX α (s) follows that the process S(ν * )(u ∧ σ θo (t)) +
, and E{e αY (τ (δ)) } = β − (β − − α) −1 < 1 with β − the negative root of 1 2 σ 2 x 2 + µ − 1 2 σ 2 x − δ = 0 and α > 0. Then X α (s)(θ o ) −α > δ for all s ∈ [t, u ∧ σ θo (t)) and therefore, S(ν * )(u ∧ σ θo (t)) is an F u -supermartingale with absolutely continuous compensator A(ν * ) given by
Finally, as the Lagrange multiplier optional measure dλ has support inside {t ≥ 0 : ν * (ω, t) = θ o }, we conclude that for problem (4.31) dλ must be (cf. also (4.17))
that is, dλ(t) coincides with the random measure dA(ν * )(t) (cf. (4.39)).
Solving a New Model with N Firms and Cobb-Douglas Profits
An extension of the model in Subsection 4.3 to the multivariate case with stochastic, timedependent finite fuel is completely solved in this Section. For a market with T = +∞ and N firms endowed with operating profit functions of Cobb-Douglas type, i.e. R (i) (x, y) =
with α i ∈ (0, 1), i = 1, 2, ..., N , we find the solution of the Social Planner optimal investment problem (2.4) and the explicit form of the Lagrange multiplier optional measure dλ. Even in this case we have that dλ has a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Assume the economic shock process X(t) of the form X(t) = exp {bt + σW (t)} for some one-dimensional standard Brownian motion W (t) and b, σ ∈ R. Then (cf. also Riedel and Su [20] , Proposition 7.1) the unique optional solution of the stochastic backward equation
with
where γ − is the negative root of is optimal for problem (2.4). Moreover, the Lagrange multiplier dλ(t) associated to (2.4) is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Proof. Let us check that ν .
